Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Every Indonesian schoolchild and every foreigner beginning to read on Indonesia almost immediately learns that Indonesia is an archipelago consisting of many thousands of islands. Nusantara (Archipelago) and Tanah Air (Land and Sea) are synonyms tor Indonesia. The national motto of 'Unity in Diversity' encapsulates the cultural diversity that goes with this geographic fragmentation. The basic tacts are therefore common knowledge, as are some of their consequences. Indonesia has embraced the legal concept of being an archipelagic state along with the implications tor foreign policy in terms of access to its internal seas (Cribb and Ford, 2009 This paper combines historical and comparative perspectives. History is useful because it teases apart the layers that, like a kris, have been hammered together to make Indonesian what it is today. In particular, we may differentiate the precolonial situation, the Napoleonic reforms of the colonial era, the military regime from the 1950s until the end of the New
Order, and the new era of democracy and political decentralization.
Comparison helps because it seeks resemblances between Indonesia's experience and that of other countries in the modem era of nationalism, industrialization and urbanization. The cases of Italy and France seem to be especially relevant and allow more than obvious Asian comparisons.
The main argument is that tor two centuries state policy has sought not so much to integrate as to standardise the archipelago within a system of territorial administration. This grand scheme has so tar had only partial success but, in the midst of this vast national construction site, there has emerged one exemplary centre, the mega-city of Jakarta.
The paper begins with a brief overview of Indonesia's economic geography and its present state of transport and communications. It then discusses how the centralised Napoleonic system was imposed upon Java and its revival under Suharto's New Order. The next section compares administrative and market hierarchies and suggests that the current era of democracy and decentralisation is giving rise to a new form of urban archipelago in which Jakarta dominates as the ideal modern, national city, a role which may usefully be compared with that of Rome and Paris.
A brief conclusion draws out the insights and policy implications of such comparative historical analysis. Harvey (1989) 's concept of "time-space compression" otters a sharp insight into the way modem transport and communications have changed the world. Two hundred years ago the only ways to travel were oar or sail by sea and toot or pony by land. Whichever the mode, speed was about the same and, subject to topography and natural and man-
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The Archipelagic Paradox Islands/Cities and the Modern State, made hazards, human settlements were more or less equally accessible according to the scale of distance. Steamships, railways and motor vehicles increased speeds by an order of magnitude but only along certain routes, absolutely fixed in the case of railways. Then aircraft added another order of magnitude between fixed points. Meanwhile the transmission of information, collapsed to hours in the case of the telegraph, has been further reduced to minutes or even seconds by highspeed optical fibre cable or wireless. These new technologies have reshaped the contours of economic geography like massive earthquakes, bringing some places into remarkable proximity and banishing others into remoteness.
The effects have been manifest in Indonesia no less than elsewhere but its archipelagic geography has yielded some odd paradoxes (Dick & Rimmer, 2003 A second reality is that economic activity spreads very unevenly across the archipelago. Java and Bali account tor 60 % of economic activity, Sumatra and Kalimantan another 32 % and the vast expanse of eastern Indonesia just 8 % (calculated from BPS, 2006a). Fconomic activity is therefore highly concentrated in Java, which is also the island best integrated by the various modes ot transport and communications. The thesis ot Dick, Houben, Lindblad and Thee (2003) was that the emergence ot a genuinely national economy in Indonesia has involved the integration ot Java with the Outer Islands, a process that began with the protectionism ot the 1930s but did not accelerate until the economic development ot the New Order. The industrialisation ot Java then began to draw upon the resources ot the Outer Islands, which in turn became part ot the expanding domestic market.
Policies to promote economic integration would logically tocus upon improving the country's internal logistics across the various modes ot transport and communications. Yet a recent study commissioned by the A S E A N Secretariat revealed that Indonesia has the worst logistics among the 10 member countries by the criteria ot regulatory environment, foreign investment climate and adequacy ot infrastructure (Souza et al, 2007) . The fundamental problem is massive underinvestment in infrastructure, a backlog exacerbated by the Asian Crisis ot the late 1990s.
Contributing to this is the role ot woefully inetticient state enterprise, most notably in railways, and a regulatory environment that discourages both productive efficiency and investment. With the possible exception ot airlines, no mode ot transport is more important to interisland integration than shipping. Here the deregulation ot the 1980s is now giving way to re-regulation that pays less attention to trade and logistics (Dick, 2008 
ORIGINS OF THE TERRITORIAL STATE
'Cood governance' may be a new phrase but the problem is not. Moreover the Napoleonic reforms, although much modified by Thomas
Rattles and his Dutch successors, were consequential (Sutherland, 1981) .
Best known, perhaps, in Indonesian historiography is the Great Post
Road, a Napoleonic teat ot public works stretching from Anyer on Sunda
Strait via Batavia and the Priangan to Semarang, Surabaya and, in an attenuated final stage, to Banyuwangi. All this was done, with enormous sacrifice by Javanese labourers, within about two years, allowing rapid movement ot official messages and senior government officials without threat ot interruption by British blockade. The Post Road was gradually elaborated into an impressive network that prefigured the railways ot the late nineteenth century (Dick & Rimmer, 2003: 118-20 The third reason why the Napoleonic reforms continued to be relevant is that they were irreversible. The French conquest could be reversed, a Dutch king restored and the empire recovered, except tor Ceylon, but many elements ot the republican system ot government persisted because it was actually better than the ramshackle version that had preceded the revolutionary interlude. Thus not only better public works and a more rational bureaucracy but also clearly articulated codes tor bureaucratic administration became part ot the expectations ot the time tor 'good governance'. They were ratified by the Constitution ot 1854 and over time, with some lags and modifications, transferred to Java to consolidate and improve upon the initial reforms.
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The Napoleonic impetus for reform was in, the first instance, military.
The Republic needed to be defended against enemies from within and without. This required rapid communications to and from the nerve centre in Paris, thus roads tor relays ot horses but also along which armies could march briskly with their guns without impediment from bad weather and mud. There was nothing much new in this. The basic ideas were copied from what the Romans had done then Gaul two thousand years before. Secondly, there was the republican ideal ot rational govemment in lieu ot patronage and benefice, hence the establishment ot a salaried civil service with a precise territorial mandate.
Thirdly, however, the combination ot belief in equality and tear ot difference meant that in practice citizens should not only be equal before the law but also as tar as possible the same. Thus centralisation was not only a matter ot communications and administration but also the making ot new citizens (Schama, 1989) . In marked divergence from the American model, it was not a question ot citizens enjoying their individual liberty but ot submerging their individual identity in the new collective one.
From this simple sketch, we can see immediately why the basic Napoleonic model lent itself so readily to colonisation, whether in Africa, Indo-China or the Netherlands Indies, tor notwithstanding its republican ideals the Napoleonic Empire was itself a colonising venture. After the victory ot Waterloo in 1815, the occupied powers quickly removed the most obnoxious features ot Napoleonic rule as they affected their own people, but they heeded the lessons. Rust en Orde (Peace and Order) was the mission not ot the profit-minded VOC but ot the reformed colonial administration which, especially after the hard-won victory in the Java War, was determined never again to face challenge to its authority. Roads, a standing Army (staffed mainly by local mercenaries) and the Binnenlands Bestuur were its means. Indeed, rust en orde, tor better or tor worse, was the only 'public service' provided by the colonial administration throughout the entire archipelago. After 1901 it was softened by the Ethical Policy but, even so, education and health services were seldom enjoyed beyond the cities, or even in urban kampungs.
These were privileges, mostly tor those who could afford them. At the same time, such benign neglect, did not, as under the Napoleonic model, seek to eradicate local difference. On the contrary and especially outside Java, the perpetuation ot indirect rule and official recognition ot customary law (adat) meant that colonial govemment actually rested quite lightly.
A refinement ot colonial rule in the late-1920s was the creation ot provinces. These were forged out ot smaller units known as residencies, which were the prefectures created by Daendels. West, Central and East Java were the first provinces to be established, followed gradually by the Outer Islands. Not only the civilian rule ot the Binnenlands Bestuur but also the territorial commands ot the Police and Army (then KNIL) were thereatter organised on the provincial system. These colonial origins are significant because the provincial system, like the pretectural system that preceded it, was a means ot military and political control over a potentially rebellious population ot 'natives'. The territorial commands ot the Police and Army (TNI) still display this fundamental tendency to preserve rwsf en orde.
The genius ot Suharto was to exploit the full potential ot the Napoleoniccum-colonial system. To set out the proposition in this way is to draw out a double irony. First, although the Napoleonic model was introduced to Java at the same time as Europe when it was still new and, by the standards ot the time, enlightened, it took another 160 years before it was applied as ruthlessly as Napoleon or Daendels might have done given time and opportunity. By the mid-1960s, however, it was already a very old model, predating railways, automobiles, the aeroplane, satellites.
Suharto was consolidating his empire while western Europe had emerged from the dark age ot fascism into a new age ot democracy and the welfare state. The second irony is that Suharto was not a colonial ruler, even it he was a child ot the colonial state (Elson, 2001 (Hill, 1996) . This was something more than the Napoleonic system.
Centralisation was no longer merely tor its own sake but actually to deliver benefits at the local level to improve the quality ot lite. Napoleon would surely have been impressed, coming as he did, like Suharto, from a humble background on the small island ot Corsica that was not even French. They were both outsiders.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND MARKET HIERARCHIES
The territorial system ot rule was imposed at a time when the then Netherlands Indies was an agrarian society. To control the people, the colonial govemment had to control the villages and integrate them at least minimally into a system ot government. The administrative and the economic system are both hierarchical, with villages at the base and cities at the apex. The economic system, however, is more open. Whereas the administrative system has a single apex in the national capital ot Jakarta, the economic system has multiple points ot entry and exit. Natural economic relations therefore often go against the administrative flow.
National integration is therefore a double challenge. Administratively it is the challenge ot coordinating district level governments with the centre; economically, but it is the challenge ot bringing together natural economic regions. When administrative control is given priority, economic prosperity tends to be sacrificed.
The situation has become more complicated because ot rapid urbanisation. In the last colonial census ot 1930, the population ot Indonesia, then some 60 million, was just 7 % urbanised (Hugo et al, 1987: 31, 89) . Jakarta was no larger than 0.5 million people. In 2010, however, 54 % ot the entire population ot Indonesia can be counted as urban (UN, 2007) . The urban hierarchy as ot the 2000 census is shown in Table 1 . Greater Jakarta had become a sprawling city ot over 20 million people. The next largest city. Greater Surabaya, had around 5 million people, followed by 5 more cities in the range ot 1-2 million.
In economic terms, the hierarchy is even more attenuated. According to 
THE JAKARTA CONUNDRUM
Clear proof that centralisation is not yet a spent force is the remarkable vitality ot Jakarta. After the Asian crisis, regime change and decentralisation, Jakarta was a city at a standstill. For several years, cranes rested in the sky where they had stopped years before when the money ran out. Yet in the past two to three years Jakarta has seen a renewed construction boom. Malls, hotels and apartment blocks are proliferating. There is no such boom anywhere else in the country, modest prosperity, especially in the resource-rich provinces, but no highrise construction boom. There is no second Jakarta, not even in the leading provincial cities of Surabaya, Bandung or Medan. This Jakarta boom is not driven by a surge ot foreign investment and expatriates.
Foreign investment, the manufacturing sector and non-oil exports remain weak. It is a domestic boom, underwritten by consumption spending.
Jakarta's renewed boom could not be happening without is a large transfer ot resources from the regions to Jakarta. This is probably happening through tour mechanisms. and went oft to Jakarta to live as many months as they could afford before retuming to Menado, which was home but quiet, conservative and boring. Parliamentarians now have the means to enjoy Jakarta's modern, globalised lifestyle at their discretion. Jakarta is a playground. It is a playground tor enjoyment, tor escape from the constraints ot provincial and small-town lite, but also, more seriously, the playground tor the new experiment in democracy. To put it in these terms is not to trivialise it. It is ot enormous consequence tor the future ot Indonesia that this experiment is occurring in a confined urban space which is unambiguously modern Indonesia, being at the same time central (it not centralised), open and tolerant in its diversity. Jakarta is to contemporary Indonesia what Paris is to France, London to Britain, the crucible in which the future is bom. All these cities were in their time resented as dens ot extravagance, inequity, vice and foreign influence and yet, like the camality ot desire, were still irresistible.
SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
The urban primacy ot Jakarta is often commented upon but comparisons are usually made with other Asian cities, seeming to imply that such dominance is somehow exotic. The most obvious close comparisons are
The Archipelagic Paradox Islands, Cities and the Modern State, indeed Manila and Bangkok (Dick & Rimmer, 2003) . Tokyo might also be invoked. Greater Tokyo (including the prefectures of Chiba, Saitama and Kanagawa) contains a population ot 30 million or around 27 % ot the population ot Japan, while its share ot GRDP in 2002 was around 31 per cent QSY, 2006: 37, 106). Thus a high degree ot urban primacy need not necessarily be a feature ot a developing economy. Neither need it be specifically Asian. In view ot our previous discussion ot the European origins of Indonesia's modem system ot govemment, a couple ot European comparisons may also be instructive.
Italy ought to be ot particular relevance to contemporary Indonesia. The
Italian state is notable to this day tor never having established a functional bureaucracy down to the local level. As in Java, the Napoleonic reforms had little time to take root before French rule was swept away. At the time ot the unification around 1870, Italy was still a patchwork ot colonies, kingdoms and principalities with no common system ot govemment and tew examples ot good govemance.
The French model held the promise ot system and rationality befitting a modem state but implementation, to use modem jargon, was another matter. A significant difference ot implementation was that the Italian state, though unitary, adopted not a two-but a three-tiered system ot govemment. The provinces helped to maintain a certain regional identity but their political role is not well defined even to this day; local govemment merged into local society and was more often that not dysfunctional. As in Indonesia, bureaucrats held, in effect, a hunting licence to live oft the land. They were not expected to deliver services, at least not without their tee. State services and privileges were obtained not by entitlement but by networking through local brokers and strongmen.
Everyone knows the aphorism that Mussolini made the trains run on time. What this demonstrates, however, is not so much his power as his lack ot it. Railways were a state department but not the civil service proper. Mussolini did not so much reform the civil service as find his way around it. The Italian post office, it may be noted, could not until very recently be relied upon to deliver letters.
The other side ot the story is that Rome flourished. Before reunification, Rome had been a sleepy, backwater, a capital only tor the adjacent Latin States and, ot course, the seat ot the Vatican. Reunification and the choice ot Rome as the national capital soon transformed it into one ot Italy's leading cities (Duggan, 2008) . Naples, formerly the vibrant capital ot the Spanish kingdom ot the Two Sicilies, began to wither as its political lifeblood was drained away (Astarita, 2005 (Braudel,1989: 38-9 ).
The Revolution ot 1789, which began in Paris, soon led to extravagant suppression ot unrest in the regions, whether tor the monarchy, the church, local identity, or local grievance (Schama, 1989) . Then came the military-imposed Napoleonic reforms. But while on the one hand the awkward diversity ot the regions was to be ironed out, one the other hand its effect was to bring closer the ideal world ot Paris, the allure ot the modem world. While this may have had little or no impact on the peasantry, tor local elites the allure can hardly be underestimated.
Upward channels ot mobility through the civil service, roads and within decades trains, newspapers and joumals opened new vistas which 
CONCLUSION
Archipelagic geography was an advantage when land transport was costly, vexatious and dangerous and shipping the cheapest and most reliable form ot transport. In the modern era, when mobility is synonymous with the motor vehicle and jet aircraft, this is no longer the case. A tew archipelagic countries, most notably Denmark and Japan, have transcended their island geography through massive investment in bridges and tunnels, Greece by reliance on roll-on, roll-ott shipping.
Indonesia, like the Philippines, still struggles with national integration, worrying obsessively about secessionist politics but tailing to address the practical logistics.
Yet it is not surprising that a recently independent and still poor nation may find the intractable problem ot geography easier to evade than to confront. Indeed, the very impetus ot nationalism, the need to create an 'imagined community' where none had hitherto existed, is itself a denial ot certain realities in order to create a new ideal one. Such negation is the very essence ot any ideology. From the perspective ot policy, the issue is whether it is sustainable. Will reality eventually undermine the ideology or will ideology in time annihilate the reality?
In Indonesia, the contest between archipelagic reality and nationalist ideology is something ot a stalemate. The reality cannot be transcended. European experience suggests that the centralised state will persist but take on the more benign features ot a democratic society. What particular form that w i l l take depends on local circumstances. France has retained the basic administrative structure ot the Napoleonic state with a high degree ot political, economic and cultural centralisation around Paris.
Many regions retain vitality but they are subsidiary. Japan, which has adopted elements ot the Napoleonic system, shows a similar pattern. In
Italy, by contrast, Rome is a hollow political centre because the state remains dysfunctional and economic activity is highly dispersed.
H o w Indonesia w i l l evolve remains to be seen. Indonesian nationalism was bom as a synthesis ot Java and the rest of the archipelago and that tension has been manifest ever since. Yet the outstanding phenomenon ot politics, geography and economics has been the emergence ot Jakarta as an enormous metropolis that embodies and epitomises modern Indonesia. For better or tor worse, all the rest ot the archipelago is subsidiary. At the same time, this capital city is bursting at the seams and subject to chronic and worsening problems ot congestion, pollution and flooding. Jakarta faces an enormous challenge ot viability and liveability but govemment at all levels is too paralysed to do anything about it in practical terms. Ever since Independence, Jakarta's constant preoccupation has been the loyalty ot the periphery. Perhaps the rest ot the country should now worry more about Jakarta. One thing, however, is certain. The future Indonesia will not be bom in the provinces because there is no common impulse. Jakarta is and will remain the most important island in the archipelago, lie d'lndonesie.
